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Respondent Gary W. Jense's Reply Brief concedes Point
IV, of the issues presented for appeal, i.e. that the Findings of
Fact do not reflect the preponderance of the evidence on the
issue of possession and value of the silverware and that the
silverware should not have been set off against the judgment
received by Mrs. Jense against Mr. Jense.

The Respondent's

Brief mischaracterizes the events in the August 24, 1987,
proceeding as claiming that Mrs. Jense's counsel "waived"
objections to proceeding on Respondent's Motions on the basis of
proffer of evidence as opposed to the appropriate evidentiary
proceeding required by Rule 9 for modification of divorce
Decrees.

The Reply Brief also attempts to mislead the Court when

it states that the home sold in August, 1987, for a profit of
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$19,000.

The home sold on July 8, 1988, and the net gain

realized from that sale was $4,417.97. Attached hereto as
Exhibit MAM is the closing statement for that sale.

The

remaining portions of the Brief are no different than arguments
made to the Court in support of the "Motion to Amend Decree of
Divorce" and contain the same fallacious arguments regarding a
"substantial change in circumstances" identified in Appellant's
primary Brief.

Mr. Jense has recognized the weakness of his

position at Trial Court by not even arguing on Appeal that his
job loss was a substantial change in circumstances, despite that
assertion to the Trial Court.
REPLY TO ARGUMENT
The basic difficulty with Mr. Jense1s position relates
to the legal principles which he advanced when he "requested the
trial court to amend the Decree and to moderate enforcement of
the April 1, 1987, Judgment in order to accomplish the Court's
original intent to divide the marital estate equally."
(Respondent's Brief, p. 5.) Mr. Jense advances the proposition
that awards made in divorce Decrees should change based upon
fluctuation in value of assets after the divorce Decree and upon
a change in circumstance which does not relate to the basis of
the initial award.

Further, Mr.

Jense attempts to justify the

Court1s unwarranted modification by erroneously asserting that
the Court can revolve the assets of the parties, on a continuing
post-judgment basis and, based upon the revaluation, redistribute
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the assets in order to fulfill "the Court's original intent of
equalizing the marital estate." It is absolutely clear from the
record that if the Court intended to "equalize" the original
award of marital assets in the August 24, 1987 hearing, based
upon changed circumstances, that the Court's intent was
absolutely frustrated and not fulfilled by its own Order.
Further, the attempts of the Court to rearrange the original
divorce Decree based upon changing values of property,
underscores the difficulty of Respondent's position in showing
changed circumstances so compelling as to warrant a complete
abrogation of a $44,314.46 judgment granted Mrs. Jense on the
date of entry of the Decree of Divorce.
Disregarding the various legal arguments advanced by
Respondent in support of the Court's Order, the facts relating to
the actual dollar amount awarded Mrs. Jense based upon the
Court's attempt at "equalizing the marital estate" on a post loc
basis will be reviewed.

When ruling on the Motion, the Court

stated:
The Court; "Well, I think it's a tough thing to
know what to do, because it's true that the
property settlement was based upon the presumption
that he was going to get a pretty big bonus,
because he always had. And I didn't think he would
have got a bigger bonus than I anticipated. On the
other hand, I don't know that it would have changed
the property settlement. I think based upon the
equities of the case, I am going to rule as
follows: I am going t o —
Mr* Peterson: "Before you rule, I would like to
make one point. He did get one big bonus which was
distributed."
The Court: "That's right, it was distributed,
that's right. And as I recall the ruling, that one
-3-

was going to be cut in half. That's what happened,
but we anticipated that he would get a bonus in
1987 based upon 1986 earnings. And just that there
is not as much money as they thought there was
going to be and I don't know what to do about i t —
what I am going to do is this, though. I think
that the equity of the home should be to her. She
should get $19,000.00 or $20,000.00, whatever it is
and the silver should go to her; and that's really
all there is. And so, I think if that goes to her,
the remainder of the judgment, the other
$24,000.00 will be considered satisfied."
(August 27, 1987, Transcript, p. 14-15.)
Based upon the Court's Order, rather than receiving
"19,000.00 or $20,000.00" the amount actually received by Mrs.
Jense is $4,417.97 from the sale of the home located at 4650 West
9200 North, Pleasant Grove, Utah, originally awarded to Mr.
Jense.

The silverware, which has been conceded to be in her

possession one year and three months prior to the entry of the
Decree, valued at $4,417.50 cannot be considered as satisfaction
of the judgment.
On a dollars and cents basis, the Court's original award
which was reduced to a $43,000.00 Judgment on February 24, 1986,
and to be paid on April 1, 1987, was totally satisfied by payment
of $4,417.97.

In no sense was the Court's post-Decree attempt to

"equalize the marital estate" accomplished by the Order, which
further points out the abuse of discretion by the Court and the
significant harm and inequitable treatment occurring to Mrs.
Jense.
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A.

The $27,750.00 Lump Sum Award in the Decree of

Divorce Was Made to Equalize the Property Settlement.
Mr. Jense erroneously asserts that his failure to
receive a bonus from his employer during 1987 is a "substantial
change in circumstances" warranting setting aside the lump sum
payment ordered by the Court to equalize the marital estate.
Finding of Fact 7, Divorce Decree states:
"In order to equalize the marital estate, defendant
is awarded Judgment from plaintiff in the sum of
$27,750.00 together with interest thereon at the
legal rate of 12 percent from February 24, 1986,
until paid in full. This obligation is ordered to
be paid by Plaintiff on or before April 1, 1987..."
The $27,750.00 award gave each party an approximately
equal amount of assets or money based upon the value of the
estate as it existed on the date of the Decree of Divorce.
Placing the award in mathematical terms, Mr. Jense got "X" and
Mrs. Jense, on the date of the Decree, got "X - $27,750.00". To
equalize the estate Mrs. Jense was to be paid $27,750 on or
before April 1, 1987. The value of the marital estate was
established as of the date of Decree and did not relate to the
amount of the bonus which Mr. Jense would receive in the future.
Mr. Jense1s failure to receive the bonus simply meant that he
could not pay the judgment from his anticipated bonus but did not
change the actual value of the marital estate as it existed as of
the date of the Decree.

Therefore, his failure to get a bonus

was not a "substantial change in circumstance" relating to the
basis upon which the award was made but related only to his
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ability to pay the Judgment to "equalize the marital estate," as
originally valued on the date of Decree.
The same point can be made with respect to the alimony
and attorney's fees award.

The Court determined that Mrs. Jense

was in need of alimony and financially unable to pay her
attorney's fees and, therefore, awarded her $500.00 per month
alimony for a one-year period and attorney's fees and costs in
the amount of $5,670.00.

Her needs and the parties' ability to

pay and incomes at the time of the Decree of Divorce is the
germane point at which the issue needs to be addressed.

The date

of the Decree is when the facts necessary to support the award
are established.

The facts established as of that date are not

changed by Mr. Jense not receiving his bonus l| years afterwards.
B.

Fluctuation in Value of the Home is Not a Material

Change in Circumstance and Does Not Relate to the Basis for a
Property Award, Attorney's Fees or Alimony Award as of the Date
of the Decree.
Mr. Jense's Exhibit P-2 and Mrs. Jense's Exhibit D-14,
submitted at trial both show that the parties agreed the value of
the home was $150,000.00 and that Mr. Jense should receive the
home located at 4650 West 9200 North, Pleasant Grove, Utah.

The

award of the home was not an issue at trial and the Court followed
the parties' agreed value and distributed the property to Mr.
Jense in the divorce Decree.

Mr. Jense receive precisely what he

wanted and gave it a value of $150,000.00.
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He now contends, and

the Court improperly agreed, that the fluctuation in the sale
price of the home warrants overturning the original property
distribution, contrary to established legal principles that
property awards should not be disturbed unless there are
circumstances which are "sufficiently radical" to justify a
modification.

Folger v. Folger, 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah, 1981).

"The marital estate is evaluated according to the
existing property interests at the time the marriage is
terminated by the Decree of Divorce."
P.2d 1218, 1222 (Utah 1980).

Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615

The fluctuation of the value of a

marital asset after the divorce Decree is not a substantial
change in circumstances. This is especially true where both
parties agreed to the value and Mr. Jense desired the asset.

In

the event that fluctuation in value of a marital asset awarded by
a divorce Decree were allowed to be a "substantial change in
circumstance,"

the Courts would literally be flooded with

petitions for modification every time an asset sold for more or
less than the value assigned or determined as of the date of the
Decree.
Furthermore, the fluctuation in value of the home does
not relate to the property award determined as of the date of the
Decree, the alimony and attorney's fees awarded Mrs. Jense based
upon need and abilities to pay.

The Court failed to apply

principles of law to the facts and erroneously determined that
loss of value in the home was a substantial change in
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circumstance warranting modification of the Decree.

This is

especially true where the modification resulted in Mrs. Jense
receiving $4#417.50 in replacement of a $43,000.00 judgment.
C.

The Court Failed to Comply With Supplementary Rule 9

After Timely Objection by Plaintiff's Counsel.
Mr. Jense's Brief mischaracterizes Mrs. Jensefs counsel's
statement and appearance at the August 24, 1987, proceeding.
This Court should recall that the Plaintiff noticed up two
motions for August 24, 1987, i.e. Motion to Set Off and Motion to
Amend Decree.

During the hearing, the first opportunity that

Defendant's counsel had to speak to the Motion to Amend Decree he
clearly objected to the Court's consideration of modifying the
divorce Decree.

(August 27, 1987, Transcript, p. 9 and 10.)

It

was not "midway through the proceeding" as suggested in Mr.
Jense's brief, but during the first opportunity that Defendant's
counsel had to speak to that "Motion".

At no time did Defendant

waive her right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
modification of the Decree.

Further, Defendant's counsel was

present for the purposes of considering the "Motion for Setoff,f
regarding the value of the silverware and did not object to
proceeding on that Motion based upon Affidavits submitted and
proffers of evidence.
Mrs.

The Respondent simply mischaracterizes

Jense1s counsel's statements and appearance.

The record

speaks for that conclusion.
The Court, upon hearing the objections, should have
complied with its own rules and required an evidentiary hearing
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rather than proceeding on proffer on the Motion to Amend Decree.
Its failure to do so was error and an abuse of discretion.
Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581 (Utah, 1984).
D.

Equitable Powers to Stay Enforcement.

Mr. Jense argues that the Court's modification of the
divorce Decree was nothing more than an exercise of its equitable
powers to stay enforcement under appropriate circumstances.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 14-15.)

However, that argument is not

borne out by the result of the Court's Order.

Rather than

staying enforcement of the $44,000.00 Judgment, the award of
alimony, attorney's fees and property award was almost totally
abrogated and reduced to a net sum of $4,417.50, which was the
proceeds of sale from the home.

Rather than an appropriate

exercise of equitable powers to stay payment of the Decree
amounts, it was an abuse of discretion based upon circumstances
which did not justify its invocation.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the Court established values of the
marital estate, the need for alimony and attorney's fees at the
time of the Decree of Divorce and then, one year later, attempted
to provide equitable relief to Mr. Jense based upon factors which
were not related to the basis of the original awards but only his
ability to pay those awards.

The Court's revisiting the original

divorce Decree and rearranging the monetary awards made to Mrs.
Jense resulted in permanently setting aside a $44,000.00 award
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and replacing it with a $4,417.50 award under the guise of
exercising equitable powers.

The modification of the divorce

Decree without an evidentiary hearing, over objections by Mrs.
Jense's counsel9 should be reserved by this Court.
DATED this

ff

day of August, 1988.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

•>. fifaJ/fld/
ET PAUL WOOD '
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief to
David S. Dolowitz, Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, COHNE,
RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, 525 East 100 South, Suite 500, Post Office Box
11008, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008, this
S^ clay of
August, 1988.
s~\

28901-28904

-10-

k MtmAniMtN! o r wounwo
D MftftAM DCVSXOPlONT

A. ^ C l I U L M K N 1 S T A T E M E N T

3ZSESS5I
1. OfHA

t. O'aHA

CO¥A

S.DCONVJNS-

* OCONVUNINS.

>. UanH\m*w.

|F-*8tt-A

C. NOTE: TiMtior«liliimi^i^loih«yo«ri a
Sftowm. * * * » MMIUMI I B A C T ware pta)

S MortoeoetRauYsnosCaee Numto»r|

tMstoaifis; wiey afa shown tew fat InlQfiRatlQfieJ

ft. NAME AND ADORES* OF BORROWS* i. NAME AMD ADORiM OF SSLLIR:

F. NAME AND ADDRESS Of UNDER-

IGARY V. JENSE

LK> RAX tfOOLlCY HAYNES

CONCORD JNDR76A6E CORPORATION

LAMA JtNSE BOVLES

941 EAST 3300 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UJAH

S4106

N. SETTLEMENT AGENT;

C . PROPERTY LOCATION:

FOUNDERS TITLE COMPANY

14650 NEST 9200 NORTH
PLEASANT GROVE, WTAH 64003

PLACE Of SETTLEMENT:

I. SETTLEMENT DATE:

5525 So. 900 East #115
Salt Lsks City, Utah 84117
J. SUMMARY Of SORROW! R'S TRANSACTION
1 0 0 . GROSS AMOUNT DUE PROM BORROWER
101 Contiact aak>» * * « •
102 P«i»onal ptopetty
10* S*t»»mt.nl cru-n«i lo booowr (ana 1400)

1P7.SO0.OO

07/06/66

IL SUMMARY OP SELLER** TRANSACTION
4 0 0 . CROSS AMOUNT DUE TO SELLER:
401 Contract Mi— artea
1OT.800.00
402 Peraonat oroporty

2,534,70

104
105

405.
Adjustment* for Hem* paid by teller in advance
406 Ctty/town Uxgs

Adjustment* lor items patd by teller in advance
10c Ctty/town UMttt
107 Courtly Uxe>

407. County taaoa

lOfi Asst&smenu

406 Atsetsments
409

412
120.

CROSS AMOUNT DUE
FROM BORROWER
11P.PM,7Q
2 0 0 AMOUNTS PAID BY OR INJEKALF OF BORROWER.

201 Deport or •sinews money
20*? Principal > mourn of now toanU)
203 CaistinQ k>an<s) UAfen subtact 10

soo-OQ
CO.SW.PP

420.

GROSS AMOUNT DUE
TO SELLER

107.500.00
SOO. REDUCTIONS IN AMOUNT DUE TO SELLER.
60! E*ca*iO*poart<iaafastrucUons)
502 Satttamantcharo—to saHer jana 1400)

^IP.OP

603. Emurvjtoan<a)H M n subject to

g^PPPPAin ram ITS

40.00

604 Payoff of brat awigaoe loan PRUDENTIAL
SOS. Payorl of eocond a*>rtpaoa loan BFNFfif
06

* PAY(rF-fiFNfFIC|A,l
*»UTAH ffi TPFASURFR-nn INQ.
209

•OftpAVnrF FOR WATFR MTTNFR
SOO

Adjustments for itefffe unpaid by teller

Adjustments lor Itemt unpaid by aetler

210 Ctty/lown UM»>
211 County*ua>
212 A^setsmenu

?P,S41.??
33,17?,??
?7,?17,P1
46D,?0
486.54

t i p City/town taxes
fll/01/BB

»07/0B/BB

4B5.73

21a

611 C o u n t y * 612 AiwuJMOtt
613.

Q1/Q1/BB » 0 7 / 0 B / B B

4PS.7?

S17.

S20.
TOTAL PAID BY/FOR
TOTAL REDUCTION AMOUNT
BORROWER
DUE SELLER
B1.fi?1?. 7 *
103,06? .03,
3 0 0 . CASH AT SETTLEMENT FROM/TO BORROWER
SOO. CASH AT SETTLEMENT TO/FROM SELLER
1 SOI Orou amountfluel o f t a r jam 4f0|
SOI Groat amount a t * bom borrower |sno 120]
107,300.00
302 i s * * amount* pad by/loc borrower |ant 220)
R1 A 9 * T X | S02 Lost raducfaona In amount «i«esasra*is S20j
220.

nrLira.Tn

im,nn?.n3

303. CASH ipFROM) (DTP) BORROWER

y*

Aftft o r l •D3.CASHyT0)(OFROa|)BCLLPI

Previous edttlea la ebeolete.
.1
AE kOOLLEY
t^lORAE

1,117.37
HUD-1
RESPA , MB 4 S O S . S

H A Y N E £ 7 j

EXHIBIT A

aonyicti

107.500.00

PAID FROM
BORROWER'S
FUNDS AT
SETTLEMENT

%•

Pwnton of CommlMion fltno TOO) — follow
70!

f

MU0FROM
BCLLfR?
FUNDS AT
SETTLEMENT

•»

702 $
7 0 3 Commission paid at Settlement
704

BOO.
•01

ITEMS PAYABLE I N C O N N E C T I O N W I T H LOAN

1.00
1,00

LoanQnomatiortf—

0 0 2 Loan Discount

% O0N00RD MORTGAGE
% OONOQRD MORTGAGE

606.00

806.00

jLfid

• 0 3 . Appiaieat f e e to
• 0 4 OeOrt Report •©

_iSLM

• O i Lenders tnepection Fee
•Ofe Mortgage tnsu/ance Application Fee to
• 0 7 Assumption Fee
•OS

TAX

SERVICE

S9,P0

FEE

eoy

•n
•00.

ITEMS REQUIRED BY LENDER TO BE PAID IN ADVANCE

001 Interest t#om

07/11/SB •» 08/01/66

»» M.gQQOOO

/a»»

0.00

VO-" MortQxQfc Insurance Premium lor
f>03 Hazard Insurance Premium tor

-L

004 Flood Insurance Premium lor

1000.

_4ZLfiQ.
years to

RESERVES DEPOSITED W I T H LENDER
2

month* Q %

11

month* § 1

1001 Hazard m*ur.*i»ce

per month

T^O

per month

0.00

1002 Mortgage insurance
1003 City property ta»es
1004 County property l > m

78.59

per month

lOOw Annual assessments

per month

100t> Ftood insurance
months f> S

1100.

TITLE CHARGES

1101 Settlement or closing lee

to FOUMERS H U E CO.

75.00

to CONCORD MORTGAGE

50.00

* FOUNDERS TITlf CO.

2S1.7P

75. Oq

1102 Abstract or tale search
1103 Title examination
1104 Title insurance binder
1105 Document preparation
HOC Notary tees
1107 Attorneys tees
(include* abo»c items numbers,
110& Title insurance

??5.pq

(includes abo»e Hems numbers.
1105 Loader's coverage

eP.6PQ.P0
1P7.5P0.0P

1110 Owner's cowrage

1200.

GOVERNMENT RECORDING AND TRANSFER CHARGES

1201 Rccotding lees DeudS
1202 City/county tax/stamps

$,0P

:Mortgage»

OeedS

1203 Slate IdxAtamps

1300.

251.70
???.00

]?.QQ

: Fie t e a s e s *

20.00

: Mortgage »
: Moogage t

ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT CHARGES

1301 Survey IQ
130? Pest inspection to

1400.

^

T O T A L S E T T L E M E N T C H A R G E S (enter on inas 1Q3.Secuon Jand 502. Section K)

JO'RXE ITOOLLEY H A Y N & 6 ^

610,00

